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An open contribution to the understanding of the OMC: changing the 
conventions supporting national policies1
 
 
Robert Salais (IDHE-WZB) 
 
Contribution to the Seminar on Democratic Legitimacy and Social Europe, Leuven (Be), 




In my contribution I will consider that, properly speaking, the OMC is not a new political 
methodology, but rather a (innovative indeed) application of the now well-established 
New Public Management to the field of European social policies; which is not exactly the 
same. One should never forget this origin of the OMC when analysing how it works, 
what it does or does not and what are its relevant features, especially as applied to 
European matters. It should be acknowledged by social scientists that the repertoire of the 
OMC is mostly borrowed and adapted from the tools of new public management (and the 
remote inspiration it takes on corporate management2): monitoring through guidelines, 
targeting by using key performance indicators, benchmarking techniques, peer reviews, 
exchange of good practices, and so on.  Whatever the feelings and expectations of those 
who invent (or import or both) the OMC have been, whatever the extent to which the 
European “touch” modifies or refreshes this old bottle, one can wander whether the 
content of this bottle has been substantially altered. The following developments are part 
of a reflection on what the diffusion of NPM means today3.    
 
To take distance from conventional approaches (and, by the way, to become closer to the 
object) implies to view the OMC as a social technology of knowledge. For, in the case of 
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employment policies in Europe, the key example on which I will rely, the implementation 
of the OMC, as I will demonstrate, intends to modify the social cognitive conventions 
about what has to be considered (and measured) as being employed or unemployed. So 
analysed, the main effect of the OMC is to create incentives for the Member States to 
change their cognitive conventions as embedded into their national policies and 
institutions, and, by this way, to begin to reform them.  
 
In each country conventions on employment and unemployment are to be found in public 
statistics (surveys, censuses, administrative data, their categories, questionnaires and 
methodologies), but also in a series of other social technologies. Amongst them we must 
include not only public statistics, but all forms of public and private accounting, law for 
its instrumental purpose, organisation and management techniques, models for 
structuring and preparing decision (for example, for investment purposes, for appraising 
options or for public expenditure). Last but not least, we must include the informational 
bases which, in social welfare institutions, determine who has rights to which benefits. 
For instance, the set of criteria and rules which give access to pensions or to 
unemployment benefits must be considered as a technology of knowledge; it asks every 
claimant (and the corresponding institutions) to look at the description of his personal 
situation and to find the what, how and when his claim could be met. Amartya Sen and 
more generally works on social choice procedures4 develop the right idea that such 
informational bases, not only back national social policies, but are also a major stake for 
public deliberation when implementing concerns of social justice in political 
communities. For, when these bases become politically accepted and common knowledge 
in a community, they tell to everybody, not only what is just, but also what the social 
reality is.    
 
Cognitive tools such as employed by the OMC are thus not only descriptive. They are at 
the same time evaluative, hence normative. It is essential to apprehend that these are not 
simply technical tools. They are not merely registering a pre-existing social reality: they 
are also shaping this reality, they tend to influence the ways people think about it and act 
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on and within it. The description of the social state of affairs, for example, of a particular 
person or group of people in terms of employment or poverty, is never just a simple 
factual description. It is a construction process that creates approval to a certain way of 
describing things. When this description succeeds in being universally accepted, it is 
legitimised and becomes commonly accepted as fact. In other words, it becomes common 
knowledge which is not put into question any more5. To make visible what is for actors 
ordinarily invisible, research must shift what is taking place backstage to centre stage 
because it provides the setting for the play.   
 
Part I applies the concept of social technology of knowledge to the specificities of the 
OMC. Part II demonstrates how far implementing the OMC can be seen as politically 
acting through statistical tables. It focuses on some of its unexpected potential or existing 
effects, in particular the development of self-referential policies, the creation of material 
(and not only discursive) justifications, the return of the social towards the private sphere. 
Part III comes to accountability and its rational targeting. It raises several questions with 
regards to democratic deliberation. We confront different views, mostly the so-called 
democratic experimentalism with the works on deliberative democracy. Until now, the 
main focus of this literature has been the search for optimal procedures that are able to 
achieve political consensus. A step beyond should be undertaken. In a context of 
pervasive disagreement about values and policies, is-it still possible for a community to 
achieve by democratic means, if not political consensus, at least agreements on what 
social realities to grasp with are? 
    
I. The OMC as social technology of knowledge    
  
To consider the OMC as a social technology of knowledge means to focus, above all, on 
its technical tools. These tools are cognitive: statistical tables, indicators, even the 
guidelines should be understood as descriptors which define the domain on which to act 
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 4
and which format what has to be considered as the relevant information. For instance, the 
2006 EES Guideline “Ensure inclusive labour markets” asks the Member States to 
develop “active and preventive measures including early identification of needs, job 
search assistance, guidance and training as part of personalised action plans, provision of 
necessary social services to support the inclusion of those furthest away from the labour 
market and contribute to the eradication of poverty”. I have underlined what should be 
the domain on which information is required. Furthermore the wording of the Guideline 
builds an implicit causality between the means (identification of needs and so on) and the 
searched ends (inclusion of the furthest away). The whole and its political meaning are 
made explicit by the recourse to statistical indicators that all Member states are required 
to fill and to send the corresponding data in national Reports back to the Commission 
each year.  This guideline relates to the monitoring indicator ‘NEW START’: “Share of 
young/adults unemployed becoming unemployed in month X, still unemployed in month 
X+6/12, and not having been offered a new start in the form of training, retraining, work 
experience, a job or other employability measure (target value 0%= full compliance)”. 
Such indicators format what has to be built and acknowledged as being the relevant 
information. 
 
Viewing, in addition, the OMC implementation as an evolutionary process reveals key 
internal feedback effects; the main of them, as we will see, being the confusions between 
means and ends and between qualitative improvements of social situations and the rising 
of quantitative performance.   
 
 1.1. Transforming politics into a process of maximising performance 
 
As social technology of knowledge, the OMC is a very specific one, for it transforms 
politics into a process of maximising quantitative performance. 
 
The political logic becomes quantitative performance, precisely performing quantitatively 
better (in the sense of higher or lower, depending of the case) than the other Member 
states. Improving performance, thus efficiency, is a good thing as far as it does not play 
 5
against the basic official objectives. Inclusion for instance is indeed a fair and very 
valuable objective, as long as one considers that the aim is to provide the people 
concerned (“those furthest away”) with the best as possible future on the labour market. 
However the addition of quantitative targets, in addition with the scoring and ranking of 
the Member states, signals to them that what truly counts is not to effectively improve 
individual situations, but to have the highest as possible rate (and if not, to increase it by 
all means). Such rational learning cannot but raise along the years when feedback effects 
become the major thing, for instance comparing performances of the current year to the 
preceding ones or looking at the shift of positions in the overall ranking. Whatever his or 
her will to truly help people and to make fair policies would be, even the best value-
oriented policy maker or public officer knows that the less costly by recipient is the 
implemented scheme, the more quantitative effect it has. As, more and more, the budget 
has to be bargained with the Treasury or the Ministry of Budget with regards to indicators 
of performance, it is easy to understand that proposing expansive and badly performing 
schemes put you in a weak bargaining position. The whole constitutes a strong incentive 
to reorient public schemes, not towards improving life and work situations, but towards 
increasing quantitative performance. This is all the more effective that indicators of 
performance are, as told in European language, “monitoring indicators”, that is, play a 
role in the political process (at the difference of “analysing indicators”). Such targeting 
opens the door to a divorce between expected outcomes valuable for the recipients and 
better quantitative performances of the schemes. 
 
The paradox is that there is nothing abnormal in such evolution, only the product of the 
implanted organizational scheme. Remember the security controls in airports. What, 
primarily, counts for the gate-keepers is not that you are truly safe, but whether you are 
ringing or not when passing under the electronic arch. If not, you are considered as safe. 
But is it the case? 
 
One could argue that there is no fatality in such a divorce between expectation and 
realization, but only bad or irrelevant indicators. For instance, in the above case, the 
selected indicator is an instantaneous one (without any consideration of the durability of 
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inclusion itself in a job or in whatsoever). Choosing to consider as included only those 
who, say after three months are still employed would correct data and be fairer, because it 
would impede the most aggressive instrumentalisation of schemes.  The importance of 
debating on the fair indicators to choose, or efforts to create better suited data should not 
be underestimated. And some aspects of the process (for instance the exchange on good 
practices) carry qualitative features and interest on them which, to some extent, can run 
against the chase for performance. However this is not the end of the story. Four 
statements have to be reminded.  
 
First ask why the first type of indicators (global and instantaneous) has been chosen (and 
not the second one, dynamic and in-process) and the standard answers come: simplicity, 
availability of comparable data for all Member states. To be simplistic and biased 
becomes a political advantage, very hard to bypass in such a process. Secondly, try to 
make public communication and claims with data hard to understand (by you and the 
audience): you risk losing the expected political benefits. Thirdly, compare with the use 
of benchmarking into corporate management (these are the same tools and procedures) 
and you will discover aggravating circumstances when transposed into politics and the 
selection of public policies. Every firm is confronted to market sanctions, whatever 
remote they are and whatever intense are its efforts to bypass them. A firm may claim 
that, due to its better management, it succeeds to lower the price of its products or 
services without degrading its quality. But if, by the same time, the users (especially the 
other firms in case of components, intermediary products and so on which constitute the 
major part of the markets today) discover it is not the case, they will stop to buy them and 
the firm will be in great pain and difficulty. All players in that case have the ability to test 
the veracity of the claims; they know by their practice what is going on and they know 
that the others know. So the fear of credible sanctions by final markets helps firms to use 
corporate management tools in a rather balanced and controlled way. Quality continues to 
matter, to a more or less large extent depending of the product and of its complexity. No 
such mechanisms exist into political markets in which governments are playing. These 
markets are, by contrast, fed with data the truthfulness of which is uncontrollable by 
citizens with the only help of their individual and local experience and knowledge. 
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Fourthly, ask whether the OMC process is “open” or not and you must answer that it is 
mostly a closed process6, restricted to few high-rank players from the Commission, 
European bodies and national administrations. Due to the absence of effective external 
sanctions – which would force actors to care with them – outside circumstances and 
people disappear from the scene of the play. External circumstances and people cannot, 
except marginally in the best cases, influence its course, neither the selection of the tools, 
nor the official interpretation of outcomes. The game becomes self-referential. I will 
come back later to these last and most important points, for they question the democratic 
dimension of the process. 
 
II. Acting through tables or changing the cognitive conventions 
 
In earlier papers7 I have shown how far the selection of a given set of indicators frames 
the normative background of the political decision-making process. It is neither malignity 
nor political cunning. It is the mere consequence of the fact that any indicator (or 
guideline) selects what is worth to be known or not and, so doing, basically builds the 
reality that is relevant both for the deliberative process preceding the decision and for the 
action to be undertaken. In other words, contrary to many radical critics who, for 
instance, denounce the European Employment Strategy for its liberal ideology, the basic 
issue with the OMC in the EES is not strategic action, or ideology. The basic issue is 
about the cognitive conventions which are selected to drive the political process.  
 
One should pay attention to what is ordinarily taking for granted, hence invisible, that is 
the collection of statistical tables that, for each yearly report, national administrations are 
required to fulfil in the areas using the OMC. One must suspect that, to a large extent, 
these tables are the driving forces “behind” the formal. So let us look at a statistical table 
and at what it does. 
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 2.1. Conventions of equivalence as political resources 
 
Contrary to the standard view, a table is not only a collection of figures (one in each box, 
for instance, as in a double-entry table), some being higher and others lower, from which 
one can draw conclusions like “the female rate of employment in 2005 is higher in the 
UK than in France”. A table is, above all, a procedure for aggregating individual 
situations, for instance relating to employment and the person’s position in the labour 
market. All situations compiled in the table which are considered as identical are placed 
in the one box, as if they were equivalent according to a given criterion or property 
(characteristic). By this logic, all women assigned by the compiler to the box of those 
“who have employment” will be considered equivalent in terms of the “having 
employment”. In other words, filling a table by combining individual data requires 
conventions of equivalence, which decide about what should be considered as similar (or, 
in other words, equivalent). The putting into equivalence is a powerful operation. On the 
one hand, one might find a 25 year-old woman with a poorly paid part-time job next to 
another who is 40 years old in full-time senior management at a bank in the same box. On 
the other hand, the exercise involves declaring irrelevant all those (admittedly highly 
diverse) characteristics which do not match the general description “woman in work”. 
But where does the description of what constitutes a “woman in work” start or, for that 
matter, end? These conventions of equivalence govern what we select, what we exclude 
and what we construct. Thus, the requested description becomes not far removed from a 
normative evaluation of the situation under review.  
 
If we want to understand what a table means and does, we need to analyse the underlying 
methodology, i.e. the conventions of equivalence which have been used and the context 
in which a table is involved. Generally speaking, conventions of equivalence are ignored 
or misunderstood by the ordinary users. Usually, users take figures as, a prima facie, they 
seem to be, which means they interpret them with their own categories.8 From the above 
statement on female rates, they will spontaneously conclude that “women work less in 
France than in the United Kingdom”. But this conclusion is valid only if the legal, 
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statistical and social definitions of what should be considered as a “job” are identical in 
the two countries. It is not the case, for the UK is using a “softer” definition of partial-
time work, which leads to consider women with very few hours worked a week as having 
a job and to push them into such jobs. Part at least of these women would not be 
considered as such in France.  To obtain an objective judgment and truly compare what is 
comparable, one needs to correct the figures and to take into account the unequal 
distribution of work time between France and the UK. Adjusted from this unequal 
distribution, the female employment rates become equal. However such adjustment can 
only be made by statisticians and is widely ignored by ordinary citizens, not to speak of 
more sophisticated treatments. 
 
By setting the frames of the tables, the cognitive conventions and the set of indicators and 
guidelines prior to public democratic deliberation, the European authorities have, by the 
same token, decided of what should be taken by the actors of an OMC process as the 
relevant description of the situation (what I would call “the table of the situation”) upon 
which to base and to develop their understanding, their bargaining and their solutions. As 
initial conditions are decisive in evolutionary processes, the European authorities have 
widely constrained the future of the EES since the beginning. They did that by using 
conventions of equivalence as political resources. One will see, in the EES case (2.3.3), 
that the final judgment on rates and their evolution is widely dependent of the chosen 
conventions. 
 
Again one could argue there has been some deliberation between the European 
authorities and the Member states to select the relevant indicators. It seems not for the 
core set of indicators of the EES which remains mostly the same since the beginning. The 
setting of a technical group on Indicators close to the Employment Committee has 
improved the situation. Nevertheless, available studies I have read suggest that what 
occurs between the national members and the Commission is not a deliberation intended 
to progress toward the truth, but political bargaining with regards to the implicit norms 
underlying the proposed indicators. Moreover, there is some invisible, though operative 
barrier beyond which the national representatives are reluctant to reveal more of their 
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process of producing data (in fact their “production secrets”, the very details which would 
be necessary to understand what national data precisely mean with regards to the 
Commission demands). The mechanism works like a system of mutual expectations in 
which everybody agrees not to say too much and carefully avoids asking embarrassing 
questions to other members. Hence nobody precisely knows what is truly processed, 
when interpreting the tables9.   
 
 2.2. The case of the employment rate 
 
Take for instance the global rate of employment which has become the pivotal indicator 
for the European Employment Strategy (and, through the Integrated Approach, for 
monetary and macroeconomic policies). The statistical convention the Member states are 
asked to apply in the tables they have to send back to the Commission is the following 
one: “Employed persons consist of those persons who during the reference week did any 
work for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which 
they were temporarily absent.”10 Statistically speaking, applying this definition means to 
simply follow the ILO definition. Translated into political convention and action, it takes 
another meaning. It means that, whatever the task is in terms of quality (wage, working 
conditions, duration, type of labour contract), it can be considered a job if it lasts at least 
one hour a week. One should call it “the convention of employment without quality”. 
This convention is far from trivial. Formulated in social terms, employment without 
quality is a task stripped of all legislative guarantees (in terms of recruitment, protection 
against unfair dismissal, minimum starting wage) and social provisions (social and 
economic rights). All these unique characteristics are deemed irrelevant when creating 
the tables. By removing quality features when comparing and placing in direct 
competition the Member States (their employment and labour administrations and 
governments) with regards to other national social systems by means of a single 
quantitative scale, the MS are encouraged to water down the quality of their employment 
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conventions11 in order to improve their quantitative performance and to be better rated. 
They are provided with incentives - not directly and publicly, but through the overall 
process and its implementation and development – to adopt “the convention of 
employment without quality” as the reference for benchmarking the structural reforms of 
their labour markets. 
 
2.3. An emerging process, its properties and political efficiency 
 
The political efficiency of the OMC when applied in a given domain, relies on three 
factors which are not yet truly grasped with by the available literature (in my perhaps 
limited view of it). The OMC develops around it an atmosphere of cognitive ambiguity 
(1.3.2). The process at work fabricates, not only discursive justifications but more in-
depth material justifications; it endogenously creates the proofs of its efficiency (1.3.3). 
By disqualifying what I will call the “not known”, it tends to create a cognitive hegemony 
- meaning by this an increasing difficulty for challengers to establish and legitimate a 
different understanding of the situation (1.3.4).  Before coming to these points, it is 
necessary to raise some methodological warnings (1.3.1). 
 
2.3.1. Methodological warnings 
 
Two methodologies warnings deserve to be made, first what happens along the process 
has not been predicted by the Commission, second, there is long and full of traps way 
from manoeuvring cognitive conventions toward in-depth shifting of daily expectations 
and practices. 
 
a. What happens, first, has not been in any case planned or even predicted by the 
European Commission. There were of course political strategies at the heart and origin of 
the method. One can discover them for instance in Telo (2002) or in the White Book on 
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European Governance. When launching the OMC, the overarching concern for the 
European authorities was to find some strategic way to enter into fields in which they 
have, in their views, insufficient or even no competencies. In practice, objectives were far 
from modest, especially as the Commission was clearly aware of entering “into fields of 
activity that are far more political and go closer to the heart of national sovereignty.” 
Some formula reveal its ambition, for example: “The OMC is a flexible instrument that 
leaves it to the Member States to implement coordination defined at European level. 
Hence, it respects the diversity of national systems whilst introducing some degree of 
continuity between Community and national arrangements.”12 And, of course, there is 
nothing illegitimate in that the European Union, precisely to become a Union, encroaches 
upon national prerogatives. However it undertakes this in such a way that the qualitative 
diversity among countries – which has deep roots in national history and identity – is 
mostly reduced to a ranking along a series of quantitative scales (the monitoring 
indicators of performance). In practice, qualitative diversity is not only denied, but 
basically put into hard strain by a process which, through internal competition, was 
intended to select the best performing model.  
 
From the strict point of view of interfering in national affairs, it works, more or less, so 
are the overall conclusion of existing studies13. But, in case of the EES, the initial 
intentions were not at all to promote bad jobs and precariousness (the main ways by 
which the official global rate of employment increases in Europe since 1997 – I come to 
this point in the next paragraphs). The objectives, following the Lisbon Strategy, were 
simply to create jobs, if possible good ones, and to improve the functioning of national 
labour markets and administrations. Hence the best way to describe what happens is to 
speak of an emerging process which has evaded from the initial intentions of the OMC’s 
propagandists and, today, is probably out of any control (except by cancelling all the 
process). 
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b. There exists, secondly, a long and full of traps way between manoeuvring statistical 
conventions from the top and in-depth changing administrative rules and, even more, 
social conventions and expectations at the bottom in daily practices. I have not enough 
room to develop this very important point and will only pick some points. One can 
observe in the Member states some moves which become more congruent with the new 
promoted conventions. For example, public employment agencies are progressively 
reformed according to management by performance. More and more at local levels 
agents are rated and sometimes part of their remuneration is linked to performance 
(number of individual activation plans concluded in one month, number of applicants 
received, etc.); the means devoted to local agencies become to be linked with their past 
performance. Activation logic, of course, goes in the same direction. A carrot and stick 
approach appears, like shortening the duration of unemployment benefits, redefining 
what is a convenient job offer impossible to refuse, or stricter regulations to remove 
people from the register (or not to include in it), and so on. This probably explains a non 
negligible part of the decrease of the number of registered unemployed people in some, if 
not many MS. Potentially marketable activities are defined and subsidized (like personal 
services); undeclared work is made, to some extent, declarable – that, everything being 
equal, tends to statistically raise the global rate of employment. A growing trend to soften 
legal and social guarantees can be observed, for these guarantees are considered as 
rigidities impeding quick market adjustment. Admittedly such moves could have 
occurred without the European Employment Strategy; national administrations on the 
continent are discovering by themselves public management tools, which are widely used 
in the UK since more than 20 years. However that Europe, through the OMC process, is 
blessing such moves cannot but accelerate them.  
 
To far extent will the Europeans make theirs these no quality conventions (i.e. will use 
them as the basis for their life and work expectations) is another question, whose answer 
is much more demanding. Historical works on the emergence of social categories and 
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policies14 suggest a rather hard, long and conflicting process. Moreover, as shown by 
social history, such a collective learning process is not mainly a matter of rationally 
curving expectations of people. It would require the emergence of an adequate 
environment with regards to material and organisational investments in firms, as well as 
an adequate language and the formation of common knowledge about it. If it is not the 
case, even the best carefully designed institutions remain ineffective. If it is the case, 
persons and actors develop systems of mutual expectations which allow them a 
convergence of the meanings attributed to the category, and, as a consequence, a 
spontaneous coordination of their expectations and actions. In other terms, they begin to 
belong to a system of common knowledge, backed by institutions, organisational reforms 
and technologies. These issues are all the more acute as the new conventions on 
employment imply for a major part of the population, maybe, a risk of loss on welfare 
and life security. They can at the end have some doubts about the benefits these no 
quality conventions would provide. 
 
However this European procedure can be labelled as belonging to a constructivist 
approach to curve the rational expectations of people towards pre-designed formats. 
People should learn that their advantage now is to adapt themselves to the new 
conventions about what is the job and to take an active stance on the labour market. What 
factors are nevertheless likely to provide some political efficiency? What outcomes could 
be achieved?     
 
2.3.2. Creating a situation of cognitive ambiguity 
 
A shift on conventions of equivalence harbours a potential shift into public policies 
because, as I said before, cognitive conventions and categories provide the informational 
bases upon which these policies are built. The political innovation nested in the OMC use 
is that shift could be undertaken without provoking collective awareness, nor protest. The 
veil of ignorance which surrounds the conventions of equivalence that give meanings to 
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data and trends creates a situation of cognitive ambiguity, in the shelter of which a shift 
of conventions could take place. If, for example, the employment rate increases, the 
ordinary citizen would conclude that his/her chances to find a job (in accordance with 
what are his/her expectations about a good job) are improving. But it could be – and it is 
the case – that the European authorities are attributing totally different meaning and 
content to the notion of employment, in accordance with the policies of labour market 
deregulation they pursue. Such policies play against the citizen’s expectations. As it is 
difficult to test general categories with only individual and local experience, such a 
situation of cognitive ambiguity can persist. 
 
In such a situation, the major task for political authorities is to maintain a discursive 
compatibility, for the same category or concept, between the old established meaning and 
the new one. It is all the more easy that most of the central actors of the process are 
convinced they detain the truth of the situation and, for some at least, presumably have 
not yet fully understood that the employment regime has been modified. Under this 
respect, it would be interesting to put to the test the flow of European discourse on these 
issues with regards to effective results. Referring to Austin, 1972, one could say that, 
while stabilising its discourse, the European Commission actively plays for changing the 
set of possible worlds in which the convention of language (“having a job”) is valid. 
While persuaded to remain in the same world, people looking for a job by reference to 
the categories and concepts at work in “their” world are suddenly confronted to a world 
where, below the same words, other (and alien to them) interpretations and actions are 
mobilised. 
 
2.3.3. Fabricating material justifications     
 
 If, as many signs suggest, shifting the rules of public policies is targeted towards 
increasing the scores on indicators of performance more than towards improving social 
situations, public policies become self-referring. For they take as their targets the 
maximisation of the set of indicators by which they are evaluated. Indeed, the 
management of public agencies, from the top to the bottom, is reorganised along the logic 
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of maximising performance. It follows that these policies not only develop discursive 
justifications (the standard way), but moreover tend to fabricate material justifications 
which can be exhibited as empirical proofs. It could be that situations become better for 
some people. But globally speaking, one assists to the drift towards short-term and less 
costly public schemes which tend to be badly fitted to the problems to solve. As data 
(especially the monitoring ones) are internally produced by the apparatus of management 
and operational rules, they tend to improve through the rational pressure towards 
exhibiting better performances. They can be used as proofs of the truthfulness of the 
political argumentation. In other terms, even if it was not their initial objective, political 
and organisational reforms directly link management purposes and the fabrication of 
proofs in a self-fulfilling process. 
 
A sign of such fabrication is that the evolution of the global rate of employment since 
1997 to 2005 is widely dependent of the conventions to which one accords the political 
priority. Take the case of Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK (Table 1 in 
Annex).  The monitoring global rate of employment (pivotal for the Commission) has 
increased from 1997 to 2005 for all (from a minimum of 1.4 points for Germany to a 
maximum of 4.3 points for Belgium). This rate takes for one any job even if it lasts one 
hour a week. In economic terms, a better convention would be to correct the data from 
the number of hours effectively worked a year by person15. With such a convention, the 
global rate of employment increases only if the total number of working hours offered by 
the economy is growing. Indeed, how to recover significant economic growth if the 
amount of hours effectively worked is stagnant and if moreover, as short term, precarious 
and bad jobs are favoured, quality is degrading? These conventions would also be closer 
to the current expectations of the citizens (working more to earn more). With them, the 
global rate is now roughly flat between 1997 and 2005 for each of these countries, except 
maybe for Belgium and France. One can understand why, among others things, European 
authorities are so eager to defend the first computation. The first computation offers a 
proof which validates the discourse of the Commission, not the second one. 
                                                 
15
 I have been able to make the best possible computation, thanks to Odile Chagny. The data available in 
Eurostat are insufficient and non adequate. 
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2.3.4. Disqualifying the “not known”: toward cognitive hegemony and a-democracy?    
 
Perhaps the more worrying aspect of procedures like OMC adapted from NPM 
technologies is that, by creating an environment of procedures of information and of 
evaluation adequate to predefined political goals (ultimately, a system self-producing 
proofs), it leads to growing difficulties to articulate legitimate alternative claims. As 
figures and procedures are seen by most of the people as guaranteeing truth by their mere 
existence, they allow endorsing political credibility. Even if the public debate begins to 
be fed with such fabricated data (without any professional or democratic control of their 
process of production), it nevertheless means for people that the “facts” are already there. 
As already existing evidence, these “facts” format the public debate. So it becomes 
harder to set claims which have not been the object, not only of cognitive elaboration, but 
more deeply of common knowledge. For to be heard, claims need to be backed by 
“facts”; these facts must also be understood, which means that they can constitute the 
basis for shared understanding within the political community. 
 
Self-fulfilling procedures like the OMC should a minima be open to external voices, 
those of the citizens or to those of collective actors not invited to participate to them. But 
they are not; even the invited collective actors that could have a say are far from being 
able to make the voice of their constituents truly heard. Because the scenario of the play 
is already written without their participation except at the margins; some improvisation 
remains possible, but it has to be compatible with the scenario. How to claim for better 
quality jobs, if in practice no monitoring indicators or guidelines are following them? Or 
if there is no room to seriously influence the process of building and selecting data? 
  
At the end, this means that, the practical experience and knowledge of people, coming 
from their life, their work or from their participation to political life are potentially 
disqualified. They risk losing any access to what one can call a social process of 
generalisation. It would become difficult to transform practical knowledge into general 
claims. If true, the path for democratic expression would be cut, even if, formally, 
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democracy remains. The social foundations for active political participation and of 
citizenship would be undermined, the value of them disappearing for part of the 
population. It is the reason why one should speak of a-democracy as the ultimate step of 
the diffusion of such political methods.  
 
III. Accountability, deliberation and the formation of new understandings 
  
Quoting Dawn Oliver, 1991, p. 22, I would say that accountability is “being liable to be 
required to give an account or explanations of actions and, where appropriate, to suffer 
the consequences, take the blame or undertake to put matters right if it should appear that 
errors have been made”. As she says, accountability is closely related to responsibility, 
transparency, answerability and responsiveness (terms often used interchangeably). 
 
One will consider, successively, the rational targeting of accountability (3.1), what issues 
it raises in terms of deliberative democracy (3.2), the emergence of cognitive systems of 
political representation (3.3), the relevance of practical knowledge of citizens (3.4) and 
how to jointly create publics and new understandings (3.5). 
 
3.1. Rationally targeting accountability and cognitive hegemony 
 
Again, we are facing an intriguing paradox. The OMC is designed for exhibiting a perfect 
accountability. However, if one follows the above analysis, one can have strong worries 
of a divorce between increasing quantitative performance and the effective realisation of 
basic objectives like: durable and fair inclusion on the labour markets; creation of good, 
more than of bad jobs; democratic concerns with regards to citizens’ voices truly 
influencing the decision-making process; and so on. In brief, the search of efficiency 
(rising of performance) seems to subsume the search of effectiveness (the meeting of 
needs). The apparently excellent accountability of the process leads to a misleading view 
of the realisation of the basic objectives of the EU (the meeting of needs of its citizens, as 
expressed, for instance, in part I on the Treaty). Bad money chases good money away.   
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The explanation of such a paradox lies in that political methods like the OMC (at least 
again in the case of the EES) rationally target accountability. They want to offer to those 
interested by its outcomes a perfect surface reflecting a rising optimality (but no real 
access to what lies behind). If so, one would be in a case very similar to that of audit 
methods, as developed by Michael Power (1997). Auditing and evaluation become 
internal parts of self-fulfilling processes. The most important driving forces are to be able 
to provide non contestable proofs of efficiency, because the credibility (hence the 
political legitimacy) relies not on the very truthfulness of the reports and data with 
regards to reality, but on the shared belief that everything works correctly. Such belief 
only needs to be regularly maintained not only by discursive justifications but also by 
material and empirical ones. In both cases (auditing, OMC), the so-called proofs are 
mostly internally processed and rely on the reporting and data provided by those actors 
(here, national administrations) who are precisely the object of scrutiny. There is not 
much external and independent observation. Some European surveys exist with (almost) 
common questionnaire and methods: in social matters, above all, the Labour Force 
Surveys and the European Household Panels; but outcomes are mainly used for analysing 
indicators, not for those who matter, the monitoring ones.  
 
From above, it follows that public accountability risks vanishing by the same process by 
which it is rationally targeted. Moreover this process develops a regime of cognitive 
hegemony which, even against their will, the involved actors help to implement in a kind 
of evolutionary process. Cognitive hegemony mobilises experts, networks, committees, 
technical and professional knowledge, theories as discourses of justification. The 
technicalities at work derive from a specific set of sciences (mostly statistics, law, public 
and private management). They go beyond mere expertise (or justification) and address 
operational objectives: producing statistics, devising or revising the rules of law, 
implementing management rules, evaluating strategies and policies. They become 
indispensable parts of the administrative and organisational machinery leading to private 
and public decision. Admittedly, any public decision always harbours a degree of 
dissension. But as the issues, variables and informational bases considered legitimate in 
the public debate already have their structures in such political methods, any dissent has 
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to construct its legitimacy. If it is to be perceived and deemed appropriate, if it is to 
replace the current regime, it must structure itself not only as contestation or even as 
alternative narrative. It must structure itself as a new way of understanding the ongoing 
social and economic realities. In other words, it must lay the foundations for a new 
cognitive regime based on its own instruments, categories and social procedures of 
knowledge. All of this leads to revisit research about deliberative democracy. 
 
3.2. Issues in the field of deliberative democracy 
 
Put in general terms, the OMC and, more generally, the development of NPM 
technologies are (ultimate?) metamorphoses of holistic states, as they have been 
conceived and implemented along the 20th century. As we develop in Storper and Salais, 
1997, the common good is defined in such states by referring to a global doctrine external 
to the society; its description and justification can be made, prior to effective 
coordination. They have the status of a non disputable truth. The common good is not, 
properly speaking, imposed on citizens; as non disputable truth, it is a priori considered to 
be object of consensus between them. Such holistic constructions of the common good do 
not necessarily oppose the individual freedom and autonomy. They only deny their 
capacity to be committed to the realisation of the common good. Individual freedom 
cannot be but strictly private and opportunistic. Hence public policies should directly 
implement the common good, with neither mediation, nor active participation of the 
citizens and, even, they should be ready to counteract the pernicious effect of 
opportunism (understood as the only manifestation of individual freedom). One can 
recognize here the basic orientation, for instance, of the European competition and 
monetary policies: to make the optimal good with no democratic control (and even, if 
necessary, against the will of the majority).   
 
A step forward is accomplished by NPM methods and, more generally, by rational 
governance. Their underlying conviction is that, in a world of persistent disagreement 
between people (on principles, values, objectives or strategies) and of potential conflicts 
with regards to public policies, the search of a true collective agreement on their rules and 
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content is no more possible. However some controllable variety should be allowed with 
regards to the effective and local implementation of policies. In that case too, one cannot 
leave true room to individual freedom and autonomy. The best political strategy is to 
monitor the democratic process towards global outcomes whose terms and contents have 
been a priori set up at the very beginning of it and, through more or less sophisticated 
regulation machineries, to let it implement these outcomes. The functioning of 
democracy is not eliminated; it is only externally constrained and piloted. Systematic 
inquiries would be today necessary for an in-depth evaluation of the outcomes of such 
political methods, their paradoxical and counter-productive effects, on how far outcomes 
conform to the announced intentions.  
 
Contrary to some maybe premature expectations16, NPM methods run against the basic 
concerns of research, both normative and empirical, on deliberative democracy. However 
these methods shift what should be the main concern of deliberative democracy: from the 
search of optimal procedures to reach a political consensus to the search of democratic 
procedures leading to an objective and shared judgment on the collective problem to deal 
with. The latter one could be said a search for second-range optimum. One should accept 
pervasive disagreement. What continues to politically matter is to be sure that, at least, 
actors come to agree on the description of the problem to deal with. At the end of the 
process of reaching such an agreement, they could continue to disagree on the relative 
importance of the facts, with regards to policies to develop, they could even disagree on 
the solutions. However they could no more dismiss alternative policies on the ground that 
they are dealing with non-existent or biased empirical issues. Achieving such second-best 
objective would found the future controversies upon the same informational basis. It 
would transform during the deliberative process, and on objective bases, “the figure of 
the enemy into that of the adversary” (Mouffe, 2000). One tries to eliminate an enemy or 
to come to some precarious truce with him; one tries to achieve a true (even if 
provisional) compromise with an adversary –because in that case one can no more 
disqualify its claims for the motive they have no objective foundation. Why there could 
                                                 
16
 Nanz and De la Porte, 2003. Note the interesting effort to appreciate the democratic quality in Nanz and 
Steffen, 2005. 
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be something to search in that direction? Because, as we will see now, the rising of NPM 
methods raises two issues, that there are two, and not only one, systems of political 
representation (3.3) and that to maintain democratic concerns in the new context, one 
must rely on the practical knowledge citizens own, due to their life and work experience 
(3.4).      
 
3.3. Towards cognitive systems of political representation 
 
Our analysis sheds light on a widely ignored phenomenon with regards to technologies of 
governance: that there are two registers for political representation, and not only one. 
Besides the classical representation of interests (through collective organisations, 
associations, political parties), the cognitive representation (i.e. formatting categories and 
providing data for collective decision) is taking a politically growing importance. 
Remember what we said before on the informational bases with support public policies. 
To be or not to be included in such bases (via some variables which apprehend at least a 
bit of your situation) has wide consequences for people, for instance you will or not 
receive some help from the community if your situation with regards to the labour market 
is categorised as unemployment or not. The rate of employment represents each of us as 
being satisfied by the statement “having a job” or as desiring one, independently of our 
own wishes or claims. Nobody has truly asked us whether we believe that such cognitive 
representation is relevant for our situation, though decisions taken upon such bases could 
have dire consequences.  Moreover, the “table of the situation” to deal with in collective 
decision is downgraded in OMC methods to some “tableau de bord” like those firms 
managers are using, which means for public policies the disappearance of any social 
justice or fundamental rights concerns.  
 
Except, to some extent, James Bohman, seminal works on deliberative democracy have 
not yet taken into account this cognitive register of political representation. Following 
Rawls and Habermas, they are mostly normative and at search of the optimal procedures 
of deliberation able to achieve political consensus. What becomes decisive today, by 
contrats, is the possibility to achieve a collective agreement on the relevant facts to deal 
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with, in other terms not on procedures, but on the substantial content (the informational 
bases) which informs the political process. All authors on deliberative democracy would 
agree that such content should have to be just, in the double meaning of being fair and 
objective17. Recent works, for instance Mouffe or Besson, fortunately emphasise 
disagreement as a creative resource for deliberation. By making explicit for the 
participants on what specific matters concretely disagreement relies, deliberation can 
have as a virtue to enrich the competing conceptions, to increase awareness on what 
information is relevant, to bring more information on the table, to develop reflexivity 
along its process. Disagreement does not impede to reach partial agreements, especially 
on some key facts or variables, even if participants would continue to disagree on 
political measures to take consequently.  
 
For Bohman, processes of deliberation should go further and build “new understandings” 
of the ongoing social realities, a key concern, as we have seen, to maintain political 
plurality in an environment of rising cognitive hegemony. Such concern calls for in-depth 
reflection about what, beyond general knowledge as mobilised by scientists and experts, 
makes the practical knowledge owned by citizens irreplaceable for democracy, hence 
what justifies their active participation to the political process.  The virtue of the 
democratic model in itself is no more enough to safeguard its potentialities. One has to 
invoke the knowledge value that life and work practical experiences have with regards to 
collective decisions. If practical knowledge has still some values, citizens in their 
diversity, in order to be heard and “known”, should participate to building of the 
cognitive systems of representation which, now, parallels the standard political 
representation of interests. In other terms, they should participate to the building of the 
politically-relevant informational bases.  
 
3.4. Democratic experimentalism and the practical knowledge of citizens  
 
                                                 
17
 In French, to be just on the double meaning of justice and justesse. 
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Works on democratic experimentalism18 have understood the importance for citizens to 
be implied in the provision and processing of information, in case of locally 
implementing national policies. For instance, Sabel and Dorf, 1997: 76-80, give the 
example of the joint definition with citizens of the tasks of police local agencies in 
Chicago. Teams for identifying and solving problems are created at a local level to which 
residents participate; they deliver information, help to formulate efficient strategies and to 
evaluate outcomes. To some respect, democratic experimentalism puts in question the 
separation built, for instance by Habermas in his “two tracks” model, between general 
knowledge (which should be devoted to general categories, hence to inform public 
policies) and practical knowledge (reduced to the local, hence supposed inclined to errors 
of judgment,). In Habermas’ views, practical knowledge animates the informal debates of 
the civil society and contributes to raise new issues or “themes”. But only the institutional 
sphere (of which social sciences and law, among other disciplines, belong) can elaborate 
the knowledge adequate for public decision-making on such themes. Our analysis 
suggests, on the contrary, that maintaining such barriers and specialisation between the 
two tracks leaves too much room open to social technologies of knowledge like the OMC 
and to the development of a-democracy.     
 
Democratic experimentalism is more optimistic. It believes that local communities are 
able, through local democratic procedures, to self define what problems are, what proper 
criteria of evaluation, what implementation procedures should be for a given policy. The 
remaining problem, in my view, is that works on that field aim at justifying the role of the 
state by directly combining market efficiency and participative democracy.  Such 
orientation, understandable in a context hostile to state intervention, confuses rising 
quantitative performance and making progress in the achievement of the common good, 
i.e. they are doing the same confusion than the European authorities in the OMC. For 
instance, Sabel and Dorf view institutions mostly as procedures for learning by 
monitoring; so doing they underestimate the risk of rational learning (maximising ratios 
more than effectively improving situations). The citizen is immediately considered as an 
“expert of the life of the community” (id:76), which makes the impasse on the hard and 
                                                 
18
 For instance, Sabel, 1994, 1996; Dorf and Sabel, 1997. For a penetrating critics, Joerges, 2006 
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important problem of transforming practical knowledge into general knowledge. The 
federal level, like in European OMC, provides individuals and their associations with its 
own synthesis of the collected information as well as with techniques of benchmarking 
and of measuring performances. It remains the “master of the techniques”, which is 
precisely the gap through which cognitive hegemony and a-democracy develop 
themselves. 
 
3.5. Creating publics through deliberative inquiry: a preliminary view 
 
How for deliberation mechanisms to achieve the building of informational bases by 
democratic means? How to build new understandings? One can only portray some 
general aspects. 
 
One must avoid two dead-ends. To let citizens directly express their opinion will lead to 
incoherent informational bases (as usual in opinion polls). To rely upon actors will lead 
to bases which will be void. Reasons for that are simple. Actors pre-format the reality 
which surrounds them, with strategic frames driven by the pursuit of their interests. These 
frames being “partial” in the sense that they cover and shape only part of this reality 
(furthermore in some specific way), the overlapping between them risks to be void.  
 
Doing differently would, in my view, consist to try to jointly construct by the same 
process the public interested in the collective issue at stake and the corresponding 
relevant basis of information. I am using here the notion of “public” in the Dewey’s 
sense. However the originality of what I have in mind is to use the building of knowledge 
as a mediating process between the competing interests.  One can then speak of 
deliberative inquiry. People become members of the public by the same process that they 
are actively participating into inquiries aiming at collectively build knowledge relevant to 
tackle the issue. As the ultimate objective is to provide some general value to practical 
knowledge which is otherwise local, individual and dispersed, such deliberative inquiries 
should include professionals of social inquiry (that are, for instance, researchers, 
statisticians, lawyers, and so on). But these professionals would not act as experts in the 
 26
classical sense of providing information to supposedly ignorant citizens. They would act 
as mediators, mobilising their methodologies to elaborate questionnaires, categories, 
nomenclatures, procedures of surveying and to give form to the results. In a word, they 
would be devoted to create fresh knowledge, backed both by the citizens’ practical 
knowledge and by deontological methodologies of inquiry.  They would constitute what I 
have called before “the table of the situation”, understood as the relevant cognitive 
representation; they would present this table both as mirror and as object of debate to the 
public in course of creation. Such cognitive reflexive process would favour the awareness 
within the public that, precisely, they are becoming a public. Hence a public capable, by 
the same token, of providing the public arena for debating, of building a common 
knowledge about the issue, of becoming aware of the common good to concretize, of 
defining and framing what are the stakes.  
 
To be implemented and effective, such deliberative inquiries would require another type 
of public action than the one provided by holistic forms of state (and of course, by the 
OMC and NPM technologies). One must speak of a situated state. In our definition19, 
situated states go beyond the setting of general categories and political doctrine; they 
intend to provide the general good with a substance indexed to the variety of situations. 
For achieving such objectives, they try to favour the constitution of publics as those 
described above. Depending of the issues at stake, such publics could develop at different 
intermediary levels, could be diversified in their organisation or membership as well as in 
outcomes. This would imply dynamic processes open to the revision of their outcomes, 
along the discovery of new or refined facts. Instead of being involved into a-democratic 
processes in which they have no true voice, actors representative of the diverse types of 
social critics could introduce in the debate, not only discursive arguments, but data 
which, thanks to their process of formation, cannot be disqualified for their irrelevance. 
Their voice would be then backed by objective statements. To refuse the political 
implications of such knowledge is legitimate in democracy. To deny its truth value is 
provoking the risk for claims to lose any credibility and, at the end, to be excluded to the 
deliberative process.  
                                                 
19
 Storper and Salais, op. quoted, 1997. 
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Is there any chance that the European political process will leaves room to such situated 
public action and to such knowledge-based forms of deliberative democracy? One does 
not know. However one can guess that, even today in the obscure bushes (or jungle) in 
which this project tries to go on, one will discover many signs or occurrences of such 
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ANNEX. Table 1: Trends in the overall rate of employment (age 15–64) 1997–2005 in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK 
 
 
 1997 2004 2005  
EUROSTAT Employment rate 
(from Community Labour Force 
Surveys) 
    
Belgium 56.8 60.3 61.1  
France 59.6 63.1 63.1  
Germany 63.7 65.0 65.1  
Sweden 69.5 72.1 72.5  
United Kingdom 69.9 71.6 71.7  
OECD Employment rate1 (from 
National Accountings) 
    
Belgium 58.2 61.0 61.2  
France 60.2 63.3 63.1  
Germany 67.3 71.0 71.1  
Sweden 72.5 75.2 75.0  
United Kingdom 70.2 72.3 72.3  
Annual number of hours 
effectively worked by person2 
(from both OECD and 
Community Labour Force) 
    
Belgium 1566 1522 1534  
France (corrected from the 35 
hours effect – personal 
estimation) 
1559 1531 1542  
Germany (Hartz effect included) 1537 1468 1464  
Sweden 1639 1585 1583  
United Kingdom 1697 1631 1635  
OECD Adjusted rate of 
employment (corrected from the 
evolution of the annual number 
of hours effectively worked by 
person from 1997) 
   Total growth rate 
of GDP from 
1997 to 2005 
(Source OECD) 
Belgium 58.2 59.3 59.9 17.5% 
France 60.2 62.2 62.4 18.8% 
Germany 67.3 67.8 67.7 8.7% 
Sweden 72.5 72.7 72.4 26% 
United Kingdom 70.2 69.5 69.6 22% 
 
Source: Data collected and compiled by Odile Chagny (Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, Paris). 
This information was kindly provided by the author. 
Notes:  
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1. Employment data is provided by OECD and is calculated per person and not per job. The 
source of the population data is also the OECD. For Germany, OECD data is provided by the 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung and includes mini-jobs; the EUROSTAT data do 
not include these jobs. Belgium and Sweden OECD data only. 
2. For 2004, the annual number of hours effectively worked comes from the table produced by 
Bruyère/Chagny/Ulrich et al., Comparaisons internationales de la durée du travail pour 7 pays en 
2004: la place de la France, in Données sociales, Paris 2006, S. 363-370 (see also 2b). The trend 
has been interpolated from previous OECD series of the annual number of hours worked. 
 
 
                      
